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Abstract
Many Christians experience severe cognitive dissonance when they
try to reconcile belief that God is wholly good (omnibenevolent)
and all-powerful (omnipotent) with the suffering and evil in this
world. Would not anyone who is loving and kind and who is powerful enough to do so, act to prevent the horrible suffering in this
world?1
This article attempts to address such cognitive dissonance by
offering a rules-of-engagement framework for thinking about the
problem of evil and the related issues of providence and prayer.
Regarding providence, many ask why God does not act to prevent
evils more often, or does so some times but not others? Regarding
prayer, many wonder whether it makes sense to pray and petition an
entirely good and loving God to intervene in some specific way. If
God is entirely good and all-powerful, would he not act in the best
way regardless of whether we ask him to do so? These issues relative
to providence and prayer may cause further cognitive dissonance
when juxtaposed with the many biblical accounts of God miraculously intervening, sometimes in response to petitionary prayer. If
God can do so in some cases, why do there appear to be so many
cases where God does not do so?
I want to be very careful to make it clear that my aim in this
brief article is not to justify evil or suffering or to downplay or trivialize the real sufferings that people have experienced and continue
to experience. For this reason, I will avoid using real-life examples of
people’s suffering as anecdotes. In my view, the problem of suffering and evil can only be ultimately resolved by God himself, and I
1
A version of this paper was originally presented at the Transforming Worldview(s)
Conference at Andrews University on October 19, 2018. As such, it provides a very
brief overview and merely an outline of a suggested approach relative to some of the
biggest problems that cause cognitive dissonance for the Christian worldview.
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believe God will finally put an end to evil and suffering. The modest
aim of this article is to explore a conceptual framework within
which one might make sense of how there could be an all-powerful
and entirely good and loving God, despite the kind and amount of
horrendous evil in this world—without in any way justifying such
evil—and to ask how this framework might help us address a couple
of common conceptual problems that cause cognitive dissonance
relative to divine providence and petitionary prayer.
Keywords: Problem of Evil, Theodicy, Cosmic Conflict, Petitionary
Prayer, Providence
The Problems of Evil, Providence, and Prayer
The Problem of Petitionary Prayer
As Mark Karris defines it, “The chief aim of petitionary prayer is to ‘influence
God to act in ways he would not have acted if he had not been requested to
do so.’”2 For the purposes of this article, I will refer to this as the influence
aim. While recognizing that petitionary prayer may have positive secondary
effects like building community or changing the focus of the one who prays,
Karris believes that this influence “aim of petitionary prayer,” does not make
sense and involves a “distorted view of God.”3 Specifically, voicing a concern
shared by many, Karris believes that “petitionary prayers for others” might
“unknowingly suggest a diminished view of God’s loving nature” since, “if
God loves” everyone he would already want what is best for them. If so, how
could the petition make any difference to whether or not God would do such
good things for our loved ones?4 In this regard, Scott A. Davison adds, “If I
pray for something good to happen, then God already has a reason to bring it
about, whether or not I pray for it, since it is a good thing.”5
Karris argues further that petitionary prayer, aimed at influencing God
to bring about good things that he would not otherwise bring about, implies
an “ignorant, ill-willed and manipulative God.”6 Karris believes such petitionary prayer implies: (1) an ignorant God, because an omniscient God would
2
Mark Gregory Karris, Divine Echoes: Reconciling Prayer with the Uncontrolling
Love of God (Orange, CA: Quoir, 2018), 68.
3

Ibid.

4

Ibid., 53.

Scott A. Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical
Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 290. Cf. Davison’s fuller discussion of the issues related to petitionary
prayer in Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017).
5

6

Karris, Divine Echoes, 52.
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know the best thing to do, (2) an ill-willed God, because an omnibenevolent
God would want to do the best, and (3) a manipulative God because, Karris
believes, an omnibenevolent God would not refrain from bringing about
good unless we petition him to do so. Put simply, an all-knowing, entirely
good, and sufficiently powerful God would know the best available good,
want to bring about such good, and be capable of doing so. How, then, could
it make sense to believe that petitionary prayer might influence God to do
some good he otherwise would not do?
The Problem of Selective Miracles
The problem of petitionary prayer, as understood above, is closely related to
the problem of selective miracles—the problem that arises relative to believing
that God acts to prevent or mitigate horrendous evil in some situations but
does not do so in other, apparently similar, situations. In Thomas Jay Oord’s
view, this problem arises “[i]f God sometimes voluntarily acts miraculously
but not at other times.”7 If God possesses the power to miraculously intervene
to prevent some evils, Oord believes, God should use that power to thwart
all instances of evil that would otherwise occur. Indeed, Oord argues, if God
does not “prevent genuinely evil occurrences while having the power to do
so, God is not love.”8 In this regard, Oord sharply criticizes the view of John
Sanders and many others who believe that God possesses the power to prevent
every instance of evil but allows some evils because he chooses to respect free
will.9 If God is entirely good and loving, Oord and others claim, then God
should prevent every instance of evil that he can.10
The Problem of Evil
This problem is directly related to the broader problem of evil, the logical
form of which claims there is inconsistency between the premises: (1) God is
all-powerful (omnipotent), (2) God is entirely good (omnibenevolent), and
(3) there is evil in the world.11 Even if there is a way to defeat this logical
problem of evil, some philosophers argue that the kind and amount of evil
7
Thomas Jay Oord, The Uncontrolling Love of God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 2015), 192.

Thomas Jay Oord, “Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical Process
Theology of Love” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate University, 1999), 345.
8

9
See John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, rev. ed.
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009).
10
Cf. the very similar argument put forth by David Ray Griffin in “Creation out
of Nothing, Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil,” in Encountering Evil:
Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville: Westminster John Knox,
2001), 117–118.
11

See J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64/254 (1955): 201–202.
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in this world renders it improbable that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent
God exists (the so-called evidential problem of evil).12
In his book, God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most
Important Question—Why We Suffer, Bart Ehrman frames this problem along
the lines of the problem of selective miracles, asking: “If God intervened” in
the biblical narratives, “why doesn’t he intervene now”?13 Noting that, “[f ]or
the authors of the Bible,” God “is a God of love and power who intervenes”
to prevent evil with “answered prayer and worked miracles,” Ehrman asks,
“Where is this God now?”14 Given that, for “many people who inhabit this
planet, life is a cesspool of misery and suffering,” Ehrman concludes that, if
there is a God, “he certainly isn’t the one proclaimed by the Judeo-Christian
tradition, the one who is actively and powerfully involved in the world.”15 As
such, for Ehrman, the evil in this world undermines any claim “that there is a
good and kindly disposed Ruler who is in charge.”16
Some Potential Solutions
Avoiding the Problems by Denying or Modifying the Premises
Such problems might be avoided by simply denying that God is all-powerful
or by denying that God is entirely good. If God is not good, there is no use
trying to reconcile his utter goodness with the evil in the world, questions
relative to so-called selective miracles, or issues related to petitionary prayer.
If, on the other hand, God is not all-powerful, he cannot consistently be
considered culpable for that which he lacks the power to do or prevent.
For those who believe that God is entirely good and all-powerful (as I do),
however, these are not viable options.17
One common way to elude the problem of petitionary prayer in particular is to deny that petitionary prayer can influence God to bring about some
good he otherwise would not bring about. That is, one might deny what I
12
For an introduction to the evidential problem of evil, see William L. Rowe, ed.,
God and the Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 121–233.
13
Bart D. Ehrman, God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question—Why We Suffer (New York: HarperOne, 2008), 5.
14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., 3–4.

16

Ibid., 3.

There are many other oft-proposed solutions worthy of consideration. Given
space limitations, however, in this article I will only mention a few that might be
useful to orient the reader regarding some available avenues. For a further discussion of some prominent viable options in the contemporary discussion, see John C.
Peckham, Theodicy of Love: Cosmic Conflict and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2018), chapters 1 and 6.
17
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call the “influence aim” of petitionary prayer. For some, this involves denying
the usefulness of petitionary prayer altogether. Others adopt the common
view that prayer—including petitionary prayer—is aimed not at influencing
God, but at affecting us.18 However, while I see no problem with recognizing
various benefits of petitionary prayer, including positively affecting the one
who offers such prayer, denying that petitionary prayer may influence God
seems to run counter to numerous cases in Scripture where prayer is exhorted
and portrayed as having some influence on whether or not God brings about
some good.19
Denying that God works miracles at all might reduce this problem and
resolve the problem of selective miracles. Such a denial, however, also runs
counter to the many “miracle” accounts in Scripture. Instead of denying
miracles altogether, Oord attempts to resolve the problem by claiming that
God’s very nature is uncontrolling love, which renders God incapable (by
nature) of intervening in ways that would prevent the evils in our world.20
However, it is unclear how such a view can itself be reconciled with the kinds
of miracle accounts that appear in Scripture, such as providing manna from
heaven (Exod 16:35) and raising people from the dead (e.g., 1 Kings 17:17–
24). If God actually intervened in these (and other) ways attributed to him in
Scripture, it is difficult to see how one can coherently claim that God is (by
nature) incapable of intervening in a way that would—for instance—prevent
hunger or reverse death. As such, the claim that God is (by nature) incapable
of working the kinds of miracles that would prevent or reverse at least some
of the evils we see all around us (e.g., hunger and death) would seem to not
be a viable option for the person who believes God actually performed the
miracles attributed to him in Scripture.
Skeptical Theism and the Free Will Defense
Apart from resolving the problems by denying or modifying one or more
of the premises, many other prominent avenues are available for Christian
theists, two of which I will briefly introduce here. First, one might simply
hold the position that God has good reasons for acting as he does, but given
our limited knowledge, we should not expect to be in a position to know just
See, e.g., Christopher Woznicki, “Is Prayer Redundant? Calvin and the Early
Reformers on the Problem of Petitionary Prayer,” JETS 60.2 (2017): 333–48.
18

19
One example, among many others, is found in 2 Chronicles 7:14, wherein
God states, “If my people who are called by my name humble themselves, pray, seek
my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and will
forgive their sin and heal their land” (NRSV). Hereafter, all biblical quotations are
taken from the NRSV unless otherwise noted.
20
Oord, Uncontrolling Love, 181. So, also, David Ray Griffin, “Rejoinder,” in
Stephen T. Davis, Encountering Evil, 139.
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what those good reasons are. Something like this avenue, which has come
to be labeled skeptical theism, appears to be supported in Scripture.21 For
example, in the book of Job, God puts forward a series of questions to Job
that highlight just how limited human knowledge is regarding the ways of
God. One such question is, “Have the gates of death been revealed to you,
or have you seen the gates of deep darkness? Have you comprehended the
expanse of the earth? Declare, if you know all this” (Job 38:17–18; cf. 38:4,
33; Isa 55:8–9; Rom 11:33). To this and other questions, Job appropriately
responds, “I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful
for me, which I did not know” (Job 42:3). In this regard, as Alvin Plantinga
comments regarding the discourse in Job, just because one “can’t see what
God’s reason might be” relative to suffering and evil, it “doesn’t follow that
probably God doesn’t have a reason.”22 Whatever else one might say regarding
the problem of evil and related issues, it would be wise to recognize just how
little we know regarding the ways of God.
Another highly regarded way to approach the problem of evil is the free
will defense.23 Put simply, the free will defense maintains that evil is the result
of the misuse of creaturely free will. God granted some creatures a kind of
free will that is incompatible with determinism (typically known as libertarian free will) and, given God granting such freedom, it is not possible for
God to determine that all beings freely do what God desires.24 In his widely
lauded articulation of this defense, Alvin Plantinga argues that a world with
“significantly free” creatures might be “more valuable, all else being equal,
than a world containing no free creatures.”25 Yet, “To create creatures capable
of moral good,” God “must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He
For more on skeptical theism, see Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel HowardSnyder, eds., The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Wiley
Blackwell, 2013), 377–506. See, further, Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer,
eds., Skeptical Theism: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
21

22
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 497.

The free will defense, particularly as articulated by Alvin Plantinga, is widely
viewed as the most successful defense against the logical problem of evil to date. See
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974); Alvin Plantinga,
God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). In this regard, the atheist
William Rowe commented, “the logical problem of evil has been severely diminished,
if not entirely resolved” as a “result of Plantinga’s work.” William Rowe, “Introduction
to Part II: The Logical Problem of Evil,” in God and the Problem of Evil, ed. William
L. Rowe (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 76.
23

24
That is, as Katherin Rogers puts it, “God can no more make a controlled free
being than He can make a round square.” Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 101.
25

Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30.
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can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time
prevent them from doing so.”26 Some free creatures “went wrong in the
exercise of their freedom” and “this is the source of moral evil” but it “counts
neither against God’s omnipotence nor against his goodness; for He could
have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility
of moral good.”27
In my view, the free will defense goes a long way in helping us deal
with the problem of evil and may be supported by the many instances in
Scripture wherein humans choose to do otherwise than God ideally desires.28
However, one may rightly wonder about evil occurrences that it would appear
God could prevent without contravening anyone’s libertarian free will. What
about so-called natural evils, like tornadoes and hurricanes? What about other
evils that God might prevent by divine revelation (e.g., a well-placed warning
or report)? Regarding these and other questions, I believe a cosmic conflict
perspective is most helpful, which builds upon the basic free will defense but
goes beyond it to include the free and consequential agency of celestial beings
such as angels and demons.29 While I do not mean to suggest that a cosmic
conflict perspective answers all significant questions relative to the problems
of evil, selective miracles, and petitionary prayer, I believe such a perspective
does provide a framework that helps address these problems.30
Cosmic Conflict and the Rules of Engagement
Cosmic Conflict Overview
A cosmic conflict perspective supposes that there is an ongoing clash between
God’s kingdom and the demonic realm. As C. S. Lewis put it, “This universe
is at war;” it is not “a war between independent powers” but a “rebellion”
and “we are living in a part of the universe occupied by the rebel.”31 The
very postulation of such a conflict, however, already raises questions that
may cause cognitive dissonance, particularly if one conceives of this cosmic
conflict as primarily a conflict of sheer power or force. If God is all-powerful,
then no creature could oppose God at the level of sheer power. If this is
26

Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30.

27

Ibid., 30.

See the discussion in Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapter 2. Cf. John C.
Peckham, “Does God Always Get What He Wants? A Theocentric Approach to
Divine Providence and Human Freedom,” AUSS 52.2 (2014): 195–212.
28

29
Plantinga himself suggests something along these lines as a possibility. See
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 192.

I make a biblical, theological, and philosophical case for this view in Peckham,
Theodicy of Love.
30

31

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 45.
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so, a cosmic conflict is only possible to the extent that God grants celestial
creatures the freedom to oppose his kingdom. On this view, evils in this world
may result not only from the free decisions of humans, but also from the free
decisions of rebellious celestial beings (e.g., demons). Such an approach is in
keeping with the traditional view that Satan and his angels rebelled against
God’s government, thus falling from the moral perfection with which God
created them. As David Bentley Hart understands it, the world is under the
“mutinous authority of angelic and demonic ‘powers.’”32 Kevin Vanhoozer
adds, “The world is now under the dominion of the powers of darkness” and,
as such, “the world resists and rejects God’s authoritative rule.”33
Even a cursory reading of the gospels indicates some kind of cosmic
conflict. As Brian Han Gregg puts it, “The conflict between God and Satan is
clearly a central feature of Jesus’ teaching and ministry” (see, e.g., Matt 4:1–11;
cf. Matt 13:27–30, 37–43).34 This conflict, which also appears throughout
the OT, is a central feature of NT teaching (see, e.g., Rev 12:3–10).35 For
example, Ephesians 6:11–12 exhorts, “Put on the whole armor of God, so
that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For our struggle
is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the
authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the
spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places” (cf. Acts 26:18; Rom 8:38; 2
Cor 10:3–5; Eph 1:19–21; Col 2:15 1 Pet 3:22).
As I understand the nature of this cosmic conflict, the devil has slandered
God’s character in the heavenly court, alleging that God is not fully just and
challenging God’s moral government. Insofar as God respects the free agency
of moral creatures, including their freedom of belief (epistemic freedom), such
charges against God’s character and government in the heavenly court cannot
be settled by sheer power. No display or exercise of power could defeat an
allegation against one’s character. Instead, God offers a demonstration of his
character of utter righteousness and love, supremely manifested at the cross (cf.
Rom 3:25–26; 5:8). On this view, much of the cosmic conflict is a cosmic courtroom drama, in which God himself—via the cross and otherwise—provides a
conclusive demonstration that defeats the enemy’s allegations, precipitating the
final eradication of the enemy’s usurping kingdom (cf. Rev 20–22).36
David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami?
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 65.
32

33

100.

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Faith Speaking Understanding (Louisville: WJK, 2014),

34
Brian Han Gregg, What Does the Bible Say about Suffering? (Downers Grove,
IL: IVP Academic, 2016), 66. Cf. Peckham, Theodicy of Love.

For a brief survey of the cosmic conflict motif in Scripture see Peckham,
Theodicy of Love.
35

36

See Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapters 3–5.
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In summary, the basic cosmic conflict motif maintains:
1. There is a cosmic conflict between the kingdom of God and the
devil and his minions (see., e.g., Acts 26:18; Matt 12:24–29; Rev
12:7–10; cf. Matt 25:41), who are celestial creatures that have
rebelled against God’s government (cf. 2 Pet 2:4; Col 1:16–17).
2. This conflict is not a conflict of sheer power, which would be impossible given God’s omnipotence; it is a conflict over character that
includes allegations against God’s judgment and government (see,
e.g., Job 1–2; Zech 3:1–3; Matt 13:27–29; John 8:44; Rom 3:3–8,
25–26; Jude 9; Rev 12:9–11; 13:4–6; Cf. Gen 3:1–6).
3. Nevertheless, the devil, whom Jesus himself calls the “ruler of this
world” (John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; cf. 2 Cor 4:4), possesses some real
authority—some genuine but limited and temporary rulership—in
this world, but this temporary rulership is quickly approaching its
end (see, e.g., Rev 12:12).
The Rules-of-Engagement Framework
This understanding brings us to a discussion of what I call the rules-ofengagement framework of the cosmic conflict.37 In my view, not only does the
biblical data indicate that there is a cosmic conflict between God’s kingdom
and the domain of darkness, the biblical data also indicates that this conflict
takes place within some consistent parameters, or rules of engagement, within
which those who oppose God are allowed to operate.38
37
I adopted this phrase “rules of engagement” for lack of better terminology to
describe the parameters within which the cosmic conflict takes place, though I do not
mean to signal that such “rules of engagement” are similar to those common in the
context of human warfare. Since adopting this terminology a number of years ago, I
have been made aware that others have also used this terminology. One recent example
is found in Joshua Rasmussen, “The Great Story Theodicy,” in Joshua Rasmussen and
Felipe Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue (Cham, Switzerland:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 239. Rasmussen uses the phrase differently than I do
to describe the way God operates in an orderly fashion, specifically “along lines of
pre-established order—rules of engagement with other sentient beings. The purpose
of the rules is to maintain orderly arenas. Natural causes are the normal causes of a
rational Mind acting throughout the universe.” Rasmussen, “The Great Story Theodicy,” 239. As part of his great story theodicy, he hypothesizes that within the story
there are “consistent rules that cannot be broken at the characters’ whims,” which
resonates (broadly speaking) with the way I use the phrase here, though I use it to
describe far more than this, particularly in relation to the cosmic conflict. Rasmussen,
“The Great Story Theodicy,” 227.
38
I can only provide a brief survey of some support for this below. For a more
adequate account, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapter 4.
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Rules of Engagement in Job
While some argue that the Satan in Job 1–2 is not to be identified with
the Satan of the NT and may merely be a benign court prosecutor, in my
view, the actions and speech of this celestial being in Job 1–2 indicate that he
is antagonistic not only to Job but also to God himself.39 Indeed, (the) Satan
charges that Job fears God only because God protects and blesses him, having
put “a fence around him” but that, if calamity is permitted to befall Job, he
will curse God (Job 1:9–11). This allegation against the integrity of Job’s
loyalty and character also amounts to an allegation against God’s character
because it contradicts God’s earlier judgment that Job was “a blameless and
upright man who fears God and turns away from evil” (Job 1:8; cf. 2:3).
Lindsay Wilson comments, this “is a questioning not just of Job’s motives but
also of God’s rule. The accuser is saying to God that Job does not deserve all
his blessings, and thus God is not ruling the world with justice.”40 In Frances
Andersen’s words, “God’s character and Job’s are both slighted.”41 Victor P.
Hamilton adds, this is “patently slanderous.”42
John Hartley writes, further, that here (the) Satan “acts as a troublemaker,
a disturber of the kingdom” who displays a “contemptuous attitude,” which
“deviates from” the “explanation” that he is a benign “prosecuting attorney
of the heavenly council.”43 Indeed, in accusing Job (and indirectly God) and
slandering God’s judgment (among other ways), the Satan of Job matches the
modus operandi of the Satan of the NT, who is called the “accuser of our brethren” (Rev 12:10) and “a liar and the father of lies” (John 8:44). Moreover,
the very allegation of the Satan of Job indicates that there were already some
existing boundaries or limits that he could not cross (see Job 1:10). In this
discourse and in the similar discourse in Job 2, the accuser argues that such
limits—which I call rules of engagement—somehow unfairly impede his
ability to prove his case against Job and God.
It is important to notice, at this juncture, that the dialogues between
God and (the) Satan in Job 1–2 take place within the setting of a heavenly
council scene. As Job 1:6 states, “One day the heavenly beings came to
present themselves before the LORD, and [the] Satan also came among
For example, though she recognizes that the satan “subtly becomes God’s
adversary” in Job 1–2, Carol Newsom believes that, in Job, ‘the satan’ . . . designate[s]
a particular divine being in the heavenly court, one whose specialized function was to
seek out and accuse persons disloyal to God.” “Job,” in NIB 4:347, 438.
39

40

Lindsay Wilson, Job, THOTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 34.

Francis I. Andersen, Job, TOTC (Nottingham: Inter-Varsity, 1976), 89. Cf.
Robert L. Alden, Job, NAC (Nashville: B&H, 1993), 55.
41

42

“Satan,” in ABD 5:985.

43

John E. Hartley, Job, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 71, 71n8.
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them” (cf. Job 2:1). In Job 1 and 2, the “heavenly beings” (literally “sons of
God,” bĕnê hāʾĕlōhîm) are typically understood by biblical scholars to be
“celestial beings” within the “council of the heavenly host.”44
Accordingly, biblical scholars generally agree that the scenes in Job
1–2 are heavenly council scenes, two of many such biblical instances of the
heavenly council, which consists of celestial beings who possess some ruling
authority with regard to what transpires on earth (see, e.g., 1 Kings 22:19–23;
2 Chr 18:18–22; Job 1:6–12; 2:1–7; Pss 29:1–2; 82; 89:5–8; Isa 6:1–13;
Zech 3:1–7; Dan 7:9–14; cf. Isa 24:21–23; Jer 23:18, 22; Ezek 1–3; Dan
4:13, 17; Amos 3:7–8).45 As John E. Hartley puts it: “Several passages in the
OT” appear “to assume that God governs the world through a council of
the heavenly host,” but such passages do so in keeping with “monotheistic
belief.”46 John E. Goldingay states, further, “This heavenly cabinet discusses
and makes decisions about earthly events more broadly (see, e.g., 1 Kings
22:19–22; Ps 82; Isa 6; Dan 7:9–14), and its members are then involved in
the implementing of these decisions.”47
The dialogues between God and (the) Satan, then, are not private ones
but are part of proceedings before the heavenly council—part of a celestial
courtroom drama. The Satan of Job argues that the “fence around” Job
prevents him from proving his case against God’s judgment of Job. It is in
this heavenly courtroom context that God agrees to allow the limits on (the)
Satan’s power to be extended, the alternative being that (the) Satan’s allegations would remain an open question in the heavenly council and God might
appear to be abusing his power to shut down an investigation of his character
and government.
Thereafter, while under (the) Satan’s power (Job 1:12), numerous calamities befall Job’s household, including the death of his children (Job 1:13–19).
Yet, Job does not curse God (cf. Job 1:20–22), which directly falsifies (the)
Satan’s claim that he would curse God. In the nearly identical heavenly council
44
Hartley, Job, 71. See, also, David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20, WBC (Dallas: Word,
2002), 17–18; Marvin H. Pope, Job, AB (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2008), 9; Alden, Job, 53.
45
For more on the heavenly council motif, sometimes referred to in OT scholarship as the divine council or divine assembly, see E. T. Mullen, Jr., “Divine Assembly,”
in ABD 2:214; E. T. Mullen, Jr., The Divine Council in Canaanite and Early Hebrew
Literature, HSM 24 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1980); Michael S. Heiser, “Divine
Council,” in The Lexham Bible Dictionary, ed. John D. Barry et al. (Bellingham, WA:
Lexham, 2016), 10. Cf. Ari Mermelstein and Shalom E. Holtz, eds., The Divine
Courtroom in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
46

Hartley, Job, 71n6.
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scene in Job 2, (the) Satan again claims the limits are too stringent and again
the limits are extended. In this second, parallel instance, (the) Satan directly
afflicts Job (Job 2:4–7), but yet again Job does not curse God (Job 2:8–10).
The “fence” or limits to which (the) Satan objects in these heavenly court
scenes (Job 1:10–11; 2:4–5) exemplify what I call the rules of engagement in
the cosmic conflict. Because God always keeps his word and never breaks his
promises (cf. Tit 1:2; Heb 6:18), insofar as God has promised to allow (the)
Satan to work within particular parameters, God cannot (morally) intervene
to prevent (the) Satan from doing what he wishes within those parameters.
While posing no limit on God’s sheer power, any agreement God enters into
would effectively limit (morally) God’s future action. These rules may thus
be thought of as “covenantal” in the minimal and limited sense that they
result from bilateral or multilateral agreement (in Job they are the product
of courtroom proceedings before the heavenly council), such that they are
not subject to being unilaterally determined or modified by the parties
involved and—since they are the result of court proceedings—they may be
far from ideal.
For a finite being to make any such case against the omnipotent God,
that finite being must be granted some limited jurisdiction within which to
operate, which God promises not to transgress. Such rules of engagement
limit (morally) the exercise of God’s power to eliminate or mitigate evils that
fall within the enemy’s temporary jurisdiction. If this is so, there may be many
instances where God would otherwise choose to prevent and/or mitigate evil
occurrences, but doing so would be against the rules of engagement, which
God did not unilaterally decide and which he cannot (morally) unilaterally
modify or contravene.
Yet, why would God enter into an agreement with such rules of engagement in the first place? Without claiming to know just what God’s reasons
might be, it could be that—given the serious allegations against God’s
character, which if left unchecked would unravel the harmony and love of
the universe and which could not be defeated in the minds of others by the
exercise of sheer power—the most preferable way to defeat the enemy’s allegations while maintaining the kind of free will necessary for love was to allow
an open hearing and demonstration.48 Such an open forum, however, would
require something like “rules of engagement,” which—as noted above—my
be far from ideal because such rules are the product of courtroom proceedings
before the heavenly council.
In this regard, John Hartley comments, “The main function of this assembly
here is to provide an open forum in which Yahweh permits the testing of Job. That is,
the plan to test Job was not hatched in a secret meeting between Yahweh and the satan.
Rather it was decided openly before the heavenly assembly. In this setting Yahweh’s
motivation, based on his complete confidence in Job, was fully known and thus it was
above question.” Job, 72. Cf. Wilson, Job, 34.
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Rules of Engagement Elsewhere in Scripture
Many other instances of Scripture indicate that there are some consistent
parameters—or rules of engagement—within which the cosmic conflict takes
place, parameters that not only limit the action of the demonic opponents of
God but that also limit (morally) God’s action. For example, in Daniel 10,
an angel of God sent in response to Daniel’s prayer is delayed because ‘the
prince of the kingdom of Persia opposed” him for three weeks, until Michael,
the prince, “came to help” the angel from God (Daniel 10:2, 12–13; cf.
10:20–11:1).49 Tremper Longman III sees this as “a clear case of spiritual
conflict” and comments that, “though the divine realm heard and began
responding immediately to Daniel’s prayers three weeks earlier, there was
a delay because of a conflict, an obstacle in the form of the ‘prince of the
Persian kingdom’ (v. 13).”50
Yet, how could this prince of Persia oppose God’s angel for three weeks,
until celestial reinforcements came? If God is all-powerful, as Scripture
affirms (cf. Jer 32:17; Matt 19:26; Rev 19:6), then God possessed the power
to respond to Daniel immediately. Here, Daniel 10 portrays a genuine,
ongoing, conflict between the kingdom of God and the “prince” of “Persia”
(cf. Dan 10:20–11:1). In order for such a conflict to take place, God must not
be exercising all his power; the enemy must be granted some consequential
freedom, power, and jurisdiction that is not arbitrarily modified or removed
but that is governed by some rules of engagement known to the involved
parties (the details of which are not revealed to us). This jurisdiction includes
authority to exercise power within specified limits, which entails corresponding limitations relative to God’s intervention.
Scripture includes many other indications of rules of engagement in the
cosmic conflict, some notable NT examples include:
(1) Christ’s repeated references to Satan as the “ruler of this world” (John
12:31; 14:30; 16:11; cf. 2 Cor 4:4), which indicate some genuine rulership
over the world, and the repeated corresponding references to the domain of
darkness (Acts 26:18; Col 1:13; cf. Matt 12:24; 1 John 5:19);
49
In the majority view of scholars, the “‘prince of the Persian kingdom’ is a
supernatural being who fights on behalf of that human kingdom.” Tremper Longman
III, Daniel, NIVAC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 250. While downplaying its
contemporary significance, W. Sibley Towner notes, “the parallelism of the verse alone
suggests that this prince is a peer of and counterpart to the angel Michael, who is the
prince of Israel (cf. v. 21).” Daniel, Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox, 1984), 153.
Cf. Alexander Di Lella, Daniel, AB (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2008), 282; Goldingay,
Daniel, 292; John J. Collins, Daniel. Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 374;
Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, “Daniel,” in NIB 7:137; Stephen R. Miller, Daniel,
NAC (Nashville: B&H, 1994), 285. Yet, even if this “prince” is taken to be the human
ruler (as in Calvin’s view), an angel of God is nevertheless delayed three weeks.
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(2) Satan’s claim, while tempting Christ, that all the “glory” and “authority” of all the world’s kingdoms have “been given over to me, and I give it to
anyone I please” (Luke 4:6; cf. John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; Matt 12:24);
(3) the evidently pre-arranged nature of Christ’s temptation, including
the statement, “When the devil had finished every test, he departed from him
until an opportune time” (Luke 4:13; cf. Gen 3) and Matthew’s report that
“when the devil left him,” only then “suddenly angels came and waited on
him” (Matt 4:11);
(4) the demons’ response when they encounter Jesus, “What have you to
do with us, Son of God? Have you come here to torment us before the time?”
(Matt 8:29), implying a specified time of future judgment;
(5) Satan’s “demand” to “sift” Peter “like wheat” (Luke 22:31), and Jesus
correspondingly praying for Peter (Luke 22:32);
(6) the fact that Jesus “could do no deed of power there [in Nazareth],
except that he laid his hands on a few sick people and cured them,” (Mark
6:5) and Jesus’s statement that some “kind[s] of unclean spirits “can come out
only through prayer” and faith (Mark 9:29; cf. Matt 17:20), and
(7) Paul’s explanation that “Satan blocked our way” from going to the
Thessalonians as desired (1 Thess 2:18; cf. Rev 2:10).
Revelation provides further evidence regarding this rules-of-engagement
framework. Therein, “the devil” is identified as the “great dragon” and “that
ancient serpent,” who is “the deceiver of the whole world” (Rev 12:9) and is
revealed to be the “ruler” behind the earthly kingdoms throughout the ages
that oppose God’s rule and oppress God’s people. Indeed, “the dragon gave”
the sea beast of Revelation 13 “his power and his throne and great authority”
(Rev 13:2; cf. 13:5; 17:13–14) and “the whole earth followed the beast” and
“worshiped the dragon, for he had given his authority to the beast, and they
worshiped the beast” (Rev 13:3–4; cf. 13:6–8, 12). As such, the devil has been
the celestial ruler behind oppressive earthly rulers and kingdoms throughout
earth’s history.51
Yet, Revelation also makes it clear that Satan’s dominion is limited and
temporary. Revelation 12:12 exhorts the heavens to rejoice because, while “the
devil has come down to” the earth and sea “with great wrath,” he has done
so “because he knows that his time is short!” This reference to time, coupled
with the reference to a specified time period of “forty-two months” during
which the sea beast “was allowed to exercise authority” (Rev 13:5), undergirds
the understanding that the temporary domain of the devil operates within
some specified parameters (rules of engagement). Accordingly, one purpose
of Christ’s work is to rescue the world from the domain of evil and reclaim it
As G. K. Beale understands it, the “dragon in Revelation 12 was seen as the
ultimate force behind the earthly kingdoms of the world.” Revelation, NIGTC (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 683.
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unto the sole rulership of God. Thus, 1 John 3:8 proclaims, the “Son of God
appeared for this purpose, to destroy the works of the devil” (cf. Heb 2:14;
Rev 12:9–11).
Implications of the Rules-of-Engagement Framework
In the instances surveyed above (and elsewhere), I believe Scripture portrays a
cosmic conflict between God and Satan within which Satan has raised allegations against God’s character and Satan and his minions possess significant
jurisdiction according to the rules of engagement that God has committed to
within the cosmic conflict in order to settle such claims for the good of the
entire cosmos.52 Against this background, we are now in a position to consider
the relevance and implications of this rules-of-engagement framework for the
problems of evil, selective miracles, and petitionary prayer.
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of Evil
Relative to the problem of evil broadly, there may be rules of engagement in
the cosmic conflict that (morally) prevent God from preventing evil occurrences that he would otherwise prevent. Insofar as God agrees to such rules of
engagement, his future action would be (morally) limited. As such, some evils
may fall within the temporary domain of the kingdom of darkness. It may
be that God strongly desires to prevent every occurrence of evil, but doing so
in some instances would be against the rules of engagement, which God has
covenanted not to contravene. Of course, God may have many other reasons
for not preventing some evil occurrences, many of which we are probably not
in a position to know. Whereas divine action to prevent a given evil occurrence might be against the rules of engagement, it might also be the case that
divine action to prevent a given evil occurrence would otherwise contradict
God’s character and commitments to love and freedom and/or would result
in even greater evil.
Given our limited human perspective, we cannot see or account for all
of the various factors at work in any given situation. Perhaps some courses
of action we think God should take are not available to him because of the
rules of engagement, others might impinge on the extent of consequential
free will that God has (irrevocably) granted to creatures, and it may be that
still other courses would result in worse evils. As such, with respect to any
instance wherein God does not intervene to prevent some horrendous evil, to
do so might have: (1) been against the rules of engagement, (2) contravened
creaturely free will in a way that would undercut love relationship, and/or (3)
resulted in greater evil or less flourishing of love.
While, as briefly noted earlier, some might claim that God never should
52
I do not have space to develop a more robust case for this motif in this brief
article. For this, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapters 3–5.
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have agreed to such a rules-of-engagement framework in the first place, it
may be that, given the kind and extent of free will necessary for the maximal
flourishing of love, defeating the enemy’s slanderous allegations against God’s
character and government requires a context in which a fair and open demonstration could take place (cf. Matt 13:29). We are not in a position to make
confident judgments about this. Yet, while I cannot make anything like an
adequate case for this in such a brief article, it seems to me that enough
about the character of the suffering God of the cross is revealed to warrant the
conclusion that this God can be trusted and that the all-knowing and perfectly
wise God—who suffers most in the cosmic conflict in that he voluntarily
shares our sufferings (cf. Isa 63:9)—would know just what is sufficient to
defeat the devil’s allegations and inoculate the universe from evil forevermore
(Rev 21:3; cf. Nah 1:9).53
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of “Selective” Miracles
This understanding sheds light on the problem of selective miracles. If one
believes God actually did the kinds of miracles that are depicted in Scripture
(e.g., transforming water into wine, healing blindness, calming storms, multiplying food to feed crowds, resurrecting the dead, et al.), then it follows that
God is capable (at the level of sheer power) of miraculously preventing and/
or mitigating a vast array of evils of the kind that appear in our world today.
Given a rules-of-engagement framework, however, what may appear to
be selective miracles might be explained otherwise. There may be some evils
that God cannot (morally) prevent because of his commitment to the rules of
engagement. On this view, while God is capable (as a matter of sheer power)
of eliminating such evils, God may be temporarily restricted (morally) from
doing so by the rules of engagement. Such a framework may account for
those evils that God would be able to prevent without contravening creaturely
free will, including so-called natural evils and other instances. The rules-ofengagement framework posits a broader confluence of factors at work in
the cosmic conflict (including many unseen factors) such that God may be
temporarily (morally) restricted from eliminating some evils but will finally
eliminate all evils forevermore (cf. Rev 21:4), without compromising his utter
righteousness and love. In the meantime, it may be that there are many evils
in this world that it would be against the rules for God himself to prevent
but that we could prevent, if we were willing to make the sacrifices to do so.
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of Petitionary Prayer
This framework might also assist us in making sense of petitionary prayer that
is aimed, at least in part, toward influencing God to bring about some good
he might not otherwise bring about. As noted previously, many wonder how
53
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it could make sense to think that petitionary prayer could have any impact at
all on a God who is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent. Wouldn’t
God do what is best anyway, given his morally perfect nature?
In this regard, numerous texts appear to indicate that divine activity is
indexed somehow to “belief ” and “prayer” (see Matt 17:20; Mark 9:23–29;
11:22–24; cf. 2 Chr 7:14). For instance, consider the case where Jesus replies
to his disciples’ question about why they could not cast out a demon, “This
kind can come out only through prayer” (Mark 9:28–29; cf. Matt 17:20;
Mark 9:23–24; 11:22–24). This and other texts seem to indicate that at least
some impediments on divine action are dynamically related to factors such
as faith and prayer. Indeed, the rules of engagement might be set up in such
a way that prayer may grant God increased jurisdiction to intervene in ways
that otherwise would not be available to him within the rules. At the same
time, the way God responds to prayer may be affected by other factors within
the rules of engagement (recall the delayed response to Daniel’s prayer in
Daniel 10).
This understanding sheds light both on: (1) how the influence aim of
petitionary prayer might make sense, and (2) why God might not answer
our prayers the way we might think that he should. Regarding the former,
petitionary prayer may grant God additional permission or open up avenues
for God within the rules of engagement that were not otherwise available to
him (morally). Regarding the latter, the way we think God should answer
prayer might be against the rules of engagement and/or may not be preferable
given all of the factors involved. In this regard, while prayer may open up
additional avenues for God, there are also many other factors involved such
that we should not assume that prayer opens every avenue. Some things might
remain against the rules of engagement, or otherwise be unavailable or less
than preferable, regardless of how much and how faithfully believers pray (cf.
Matt 26:39; Luke 22:32).
In this regard, Christians sometimes pray as if every outcome is “up to”
God alone, without any cognizance that God himself may face impediments
due to his commitments to love and the rules of engagement. This sometimes
causes severe cognitive dissonance; for instance, when prayer for a loved one
to be cured of some terminal disease appears to make no difference. However,
it might be that God deeply wants to cure that loved one but that avenue is
not (morally) available to God given all the other factors involved. According
to Scripture, as briefly noted earlier, God often does not get what he wants.
In this regard, it seems to me that there is much to learn from Christ’s
words in his prayer in Gethsemane: “My Father, if it is possible, let this cup
pass from Me; yet not as I will, but as You will” (Matt 26:39, emphasis mine).
If it is possible? This phrase suggests that some avenues are not open to God
given his purposes and the commitments that he has made. For instance,
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apart from Jesus enduring the cross, God could not justify and save humans
while himself remaining just (cf. Rom 3:24–26). As such, Christians might
offer petitionary prayer in a similar manner, praying not only that God’s
“will be done” (Matt 6:10) but also, “if it is possible, let this cup pass,” while
intentionally recognizing that some outcomes may not be options (morally
speaking) for God to bring about.
Given a cosmic conflict perspective with a rules-of-engagement framework, there are far more factors involved relative to God’s action—or seeming
inaction—than we could fathom. On this view, petitionary prayer (with
the “influence aim”) need not imply that God is “ignorant, ill-willed,” or
“manipulative.”54 Rather, on the view that in some cases it might be against
the rules of engagement for God to bring about a specific good he might
otherwise want to bring about, but petitionary prayer might open additional
avenues to God within those rules, one can consistently pray to God for
his intervention while affirming that God knows what is most preferable in
any situation, truly wants to bring about what is most preferable in every
situation, and is never manipulative but is always entirely loving. As such,
Christians can coherently and fervently pray for divine intervention and even
cry out to God when we feel forsaken (Matt 27:46), while trusting in God’s
perfect wisdom and unwavering benevolence (cf. Ps 22; Dan 3:17–18).
Conclusion
The problem of evil is massive and complex and much more should be said
about not only the problem of evil, but also the related problems of selective
miracles and petitionary prayer. I am under no illusion that this brief article
sufficiently addresses the many questions related to these problems. However,
this article offers some ways that a rules-of-engagement framework might be
helpful to advance the conversation regarding these massive and troubling
issues, which hold numerous implications relative to how Christians think
about God and relate to God in prayer (and otherwise). If nothing else, we
should recognize that there is far more to the story; much of which we may
be currently unaware. The ultimate solution to evil is eschatological. In the
meantime, I believe, the God of the Bible, supremely revealed in Jesus Christ,
can be trusted.
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